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[Abstract:] Aristotle made important contributions to the study of developmental biology, 
including the complete metamorphosis of insects. One concept in particular, that of the perfect or 
complete state, underlies Aristotle’s ideas about metamorphosis, the necessity of fertilisation for 
embryonic development, and whether morphogenesis involves an autonomous process of self-
assembly. Importantly, the philosopher erroneously views metamorphosis as a necessary 
developmental response to lack of previous fertilization of the female parent, a view that is 
intimately connected with his readiness to accept the idea of the spontaneous generation of life. 
Aristotle’s work underpins that of the major seventeenth century students of metamorphosis, Harvey, 
Redi, Malpighi and Swammerdam, all of whom make frequent reference to Aristotle in their 
writings. Although both Aristotle and Harvey are often credited with inspiring the later prolonged 
debate between proponents of epigenesis and preformation, neither actually held firm views on the 
subject. Aristotle’s idea of the perfect stage also underlies his proposal that the eggs of 
holometabolous insects hatch “before their time”, an idea that is the direct precursor of the much 
later proposals by Lubbock and Berlese that the larval stages of holometabolous insects are due to 
the "premature hatching" from the egg of an imperfect embryonic stage.  
Abstract: 200 words 
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1. Introduction: Aristotle, developmental biology and metamorphosis 
The Greek philosopher Aristotle (Aristotelis, Ἀριστοτέλης, 384–322 BCE), has long been considered 
to have been the first “real” biological scientist (1,2,3) and was also the first person known to have 
seriously enquired into the nature and causes of animal metamorphosis.  
Aristotle was interested in the complete metamorphosis of insects not only because he was 
continually curious about the variety of animal life and form, but because he recognised that the 
radical transformation of an externally simple worm-like insect larva to a highly complex adult insect 
offered an opportunity to test out his ideas about animal reproduction and embryonic development. 
As will be shown below, the philosopher believed that metamorphosis and the mystery of the 
spontaneous generation of life were linked. For Aristotle, explaining metamorphosis was an 
opportunity to explain the origin of life from non-living material. 
In one sense, his most important contribution was simply to assert that metamorphosis  
“which may well cause surprise to many people, is really quite regular and normal” 1 (Aristotle, 1942; Generation of 
Animals) [GA 758b28] (4). 
 
In other words, he did not ascribe metamorphosis to magic or hidden divine causes. But the 
philosopher also introduced an important idea into thinking about morphogenesis and metamorphosis 
that had profound effects on the way that much later scientists approached these subjects. This is the 
concept of the perfect condition and is the subject of this paper.  In both ancient and modern Greek, 
the word is Teleos (τέλειος), which means “perfect”, “complete” or “finished”. The word is 
important in this paper because in Aristotle’s view, complete metamorphosis is a developmental 
process that allows an imperfect animal to attain the condition of perfection. Aristotle’s idea of 
perfection was an important influence on the views of the anatomists of the seventeenth century 
Scientific Revolution, who are generally credited with revealing the significance of complete 
metamorphosis in the lives of insects; Aristotle’s ideas continued to influence biological scientists 
until the nineteenth century, but because the philosopher was explicit in supposing that development 
is a “teleological” process (i.e. one that is driven towards a predetermined purpose or end, the 
production of the “perfect” organism), they have not in recent times inspired much scientific 
enthusiasm.  
                                                          
1 All quotes from Aristotle are from the Loeb parallel Greek-English editions of “Generation of Animals” (4) or “History of Animals” (5, 
6) References to the Greek text are given as Bekker numbers in the standard format of Aristotelian scholarship. Full bibliographic 
details of the editions that I have consulted are in the reference list. 
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But it is also possible to regard “perfect” as being simply a descriptive adjective, meaning that 
morphogenesis is now complete and no further morphological change will occur and I argue that in 
this sense, Aristotle’s idea that morphogenesis can only progress towards completion when certain 
internal conditions are satisfied remains a useful one. Without wishing to imply that Aristotle was in 
any way able to anticipate our present understanding of animal reproduction and development in 
terms of molecular genetics and biochemistry, I nevertheless suggest that his ideas are indeed 
precursors of our current biological understanding of development and metamorphosis, in exactly the 
same way as those of Democritus anticipated modern ideas of the nature of matter by positing the 
existence of atoms (7).  
Aristotle’s ideas about development and metamorphosis were regarded at the time by the seventeenth 
century scientists from whom our present paradigm of these subjects derives, as the direct precursors 
of their own investigations (8). Harvey (9), Malpighi (10) and Swammerdam (11) cited Aristotle on 
almost every page of their works. In modern times, the philosopher’s scientific work has frequently 
been dismissed as seriously flawed and only semi-scientific (12, 13). It must be admitted that 
Aristotle’s science had limitations. As a philosopher, Aristotle was primarily interested in the 
purpose and causation of natural phenomena, by which is meant why and how they come about. To 
examine these questions, he employed direct observation, and also interrogated others who he 
believed were reliable informants, thus assembling an extensive database of natural phenomena in 
which he attempted to discern patterns. As Leroi has noted [2], this procedure was used to investigate 
causation through correlation and extrapolation in essentially the same way as what we now call the 
comparative method. What Aristotle did not do, however, was to test his ideas about causation using 
experiments in which he interfered with the proposed causes; inevitably, this caused him to draw 
erroneous conclusions [2, 12, 13]. Aristotle’s interest in purpose was arguably even less scientific 
than his interest in causes, and he relied mostly on teleological arguments, reiterating again and again 
that the final cause of something is “that for the sake of which a thing is done” (14). It might well be 
observed here that this approach is not so different to the modus operandi of those evolutionary 
biologists who attribute “adaptive” function to heritable traits, on the similarly circular argument that 
these traits must be adaptive or they would not persist. Without an experimental test, the value of 
such ideas is at best questionable (15).  
Do these limitations of some aspects of Aristotle’s ideas about animal development mean that we 
should ignore his contributions to understanding the biology and evolution of metamorphosis? I 
contend that it is always a good thing to know where today’s ideas originally came from, even if the 
original versions have been superceded.  
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2. Aristotle and the energetics of animal development 
Aristotle was interested in complete metamorphosis because he was investigating animal 
development. He believed that an insect pupa was like an egg, except that the animal developing 
within it was much larger and therefore easier to study. Doubtless like countless others before and 
since, Aristotle wondered how a complete animal can be assembled from an apparently almost 
formless egg. The process is astonishing, because outside of the realm of living things, highly 
complex structures, whatever they are made of, do not normally self-assemble from simpler 
materials. Yet when a new animal is generated, order is apparently being created out of disorder. 
Understanding the problem of what Aristotle called Genesis (γένεσις, “generation”), a discipline 
encompassing both reproduction and embryonic development, thus promised to supply an answer to 
the nature of life.  
We now recognise that the problem of generation is fundamentally one of entropy (16). By creating a 
highly structured assembly of complex components out of simpler disordered materials, living 
systems locally reduce entropy at the expense of increasing the total entropy of the system and its 
surroundings.  During growth and development, the organism must “pay” for the generation of 
additional living material by dissipating energy, the interconversion of energy and entropy being 
mediated by metabolic chemical reactions; another way to put this is to say that generation is 
energetically costly (17). Ideas like this were of course entirely unknown to Aristotle. Nevertheless, 
in his investigations of development, he followed what we can now recognise as a thermodynamic 
approach to the problem; hypothesising that the transformation of an imperfect offspring to a perfect 
one requires what we would now call “energy”. Aristotle did not have a concept of energy in the 
modern sense of the capability to perform work; instead he referred to Dynamis (Δύναμις – literally 
“capability” or “power”), an attribute which had the potential to cause diverse kinds of change; these 
effects of Dynamis were sometimes characterised as “metabolism” (μεταβολή) or “energy” 
(ενέργεια), and manifested themselves as “heat” [Thermon (θερμόν)], or sometimes as “movement” 
[Kinesis (κίνησις)]. For Aristotle, a clue to this involvement of energy in development was doubtless 
supplied by the well-known fact that to hatch a hen’s egg, you have to keep it warm. 
Aristotle was interested in fertilisation; he explained how an energetic agent present in the seminal 
fluid supplied by the male might cause the change in form of the materials supplied by the female (he 
calls these materials the “fetation”) by likening its action to that of a carpenter on the wood that is 
being worked. He says that rather than the addition of adding new material, this is a question of 
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action (i.e. a supply of energy – here Aristotle calls it “movement”) and information (he calls it 
“Soul”, best regarded as “form and knowledge”): 
“this semen is not a part of the fetation as it develops. In the same way nothing passes from the carpenter into the 
pieces of timber, which are his material, and there is no part of the art of carpentry present in the object which is 
being fashioned; it is the shape and the form which pass from the carpenter, and they come into being by the 
movement in the material. It is his soul, wherein is the form, and his knowledge, which cause his hands…to move in a 
particular way…; his hands move his tools and his tools move the material.” [GA730b11-19]. 
 
Famously, in many passages of his book Generation of Animals (4), the philosopher also likens 
embryogenesis to cooking. Supplying “heat” to the materials of which an egg is formed, he argues, 
causes them to reorganize first into the form of the embryo, and then as the cooking continues, into 
the adult animal. Using a simple analogy, he points out that a familiar material like milk can be “set” 
or curdled when it is heated [GA 729a11-14]. He argues that since nothing is added to the milk when 
it is heated, the altered form of the milk when it has been set must from the start have been inherent 
in its own nature or essence; the change in form that occurs when it is heated merely being 
encouraged or permitted by the cooking process. This is entirely compatible with our own modern 
ideas about how protein structure is determined by its amino acid sequence; all that the heat 
treatment does is to allow the milk proteins to reorganise themselves into a lower energy state than 
when they were initially synthesised. Remarkably, Aristotle goes on to point out that setting of milk 
doesn’t have to be achieved by cooking but can be produced by adding a rennet or setting agent (he 
particularly mentions fig juice, long known to have the property of curdling milk). He says that it is 
in the nature or essence of the fig juice to set the milk, just as it is in the nature or essence of the milk 
to be coagulated. It is as though the rennet supplies heat to the milk. We now know that the setting 
agent in fig juice is an enzyme, the cysteine endopeptidase ficain, which cleaves the milk protein 
casein, altering its molecular shape, and rendering it insoluble (18). The point of this story is that 
Aristotle is here envisaging that the tendency to “set” (i.e. to develop) is inherent in the materials of 
the egg, and is released or catalysed by fertilisation. Interestingly, Aristotle noted that the fertilising 
agent in the semen would not be consumed or incorporated into the offspring: 
“The physical part of the semen, being fluid and watery, dissolves and evaporates; and on that account we should not 
always be trying to detect it… as an ingredient of the fetation when that has set and taken shape, any more than we 
should expect to trace the fig-juice which sets and curdles milk” [GA 737a12-17]. 
 
Of course, embryogenesis involves much more than such changes to the structures of one or more 
egg proteins, and Aristotle was aware of this. He recognised that many additional structural and 
spatial changes would be sequentially required to shape the form of the developing animal. In still 
another analogy, he compared the ensuing sequence of developmental events that occurs during 
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embryonic morphogenesis to the sequences of movements performed by classical Greek temple 
automatons. The precise nature of these religious machines is not now known (19), but it is clear 
from Aristotle’s discussion that they had parts connected to each other by levers and pivots, were 
powered by stored energy, and were set in motion by an operator from outside. This being so: 
“the parts of these automatons, even while at rest, have in them somehow or other a potentiality, and when some 
external agency sets the first part in movement, then immediately the adjacent part comes to be in actuality” [GA 
734b10-13]. 
 
In a similar fashion, argues Aristotle, once embryogenesis has been initiated by fertilisation, one 
thing follows another without further intervention by the initiating agent. Since we now know that 
much of the mechanics of embryogenesis relates to changes in the recruitment of high-level 
transcription factors, we may suppose that a stereotyped and progressive programme of 
transcriptional changes is an important part of the process. There is every reason to suppose that this 
programme of change is indeed inherent in the developing organism and could be set in motion in an 
automaton-like way by a primary activating agent associated with fertilisation, and then coordinated 
by subsidiary activating agents already present within the undeveloped embryo. 
 
3. Aristotle and fertilisation 
Aristotle has now established a plausible model for the mechanism that sets embryonic development 
in motion. But in the case of animal generation, where does the “heat” or “movement” required to 
provoke the “setting” of the raw material of the embryo come from? He insists that this is supplied 
exclusively by the male parent, noting that eggs produced and laid by female animals do not develop 
further unless they are fertilised by a male. Therefore, he argues, the heat (or other form of energy) 
that does the cooking must be supplied by the male, contained within the seminal fluid.  
Aristotle now supposes that just as fig juice comes from a fruit that has matured in the heat of 
summer, semen is a substance that has matured in the heat of a male animal’s testes. He does not 
know what it is about the male that allows this to happen, but he again draws the parallel with 
cooking and supposes that the male is “hotter” than the female, allowing the maturation of semen to 
take place. What he is really saying is that it is in the nature or essence of the semen to contain 
something (which he likens to “heat”) that has the power to initiate the “setting” of the egg-material, 
and which is not contained in the egg itself.  
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What is this “heat” in the semen? Aristotle attempts to explain it in a number of ways. Most 
importantly, he says that it is supplied by an attribute of the semen called Pneuma (Πνεύμα) or 
“breath”. This Pneuma is an agent or vehicle, a kind of vector for the factors that actually put into 
effect the morphogenetic processes shaping the animal. Its effects are mediated by the heat and 
movement that it mobilises. These are not literally heat and movement, just as Pneuma is not literally 
the “breath” of the animal concerned, nor is it breathed in from outside; its downstream effects are 
evidently energetic in some sense 2. While Aristotle’s terminology is awkward in the context of 
modern science, it should be noted that these concepts can relatively easily be accommodated in 
terms of a model in which energy-yielding cellular processes are used to effect developmental 
change during embryogenesis. 
The scheme just described not only attempts to explain in mechanistic terms the mystery of how the 
complex structures of living things are formed, but also supplies an answer to the problems of sex 
and its place in the life of animals. Unfortunately, however, a serious problem emerges very quickly. 
This is because not only was it known to the philosopher that some animals generate offspring 
without being seen to copulate, but it was also generally believed at that time that some forms of life 
were generated spontaneously from non-living materials.  
How could Aristotle’s “cooking” model of embryonic development be reconciled with these two 
problems? The answer is that the philosopher sidestepped the problem by supposing that lack of 
fertilisation and spontaneous generation are actually the same thing, and that complete 
metamorphosis is the natural consequence of them both. Aristotle’s interest in metamorphosis can 
thus be seen to stem very largely from his need to accommodate the phenomenon of spontaneous 
generation in his scheme of animal development. To explain how he attempted to solve the problem 
of spontaneous generation, we must introduce the idea of the perfect condition. 
 
4. Aristotle: complete metamorphosis and the perfect condition 
Aristotle’s idea of the prefect state of an animal is a philosophically hybrid concept incorporating 
Plato’s notion of the definitive or essential but abstract version of the form (i.e. morphology) of an 
animal, as well as the typically Aristotelian element of the causal factors involved in the generation 
of that form. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not anywhere in his surviving writings produce a single 
statement that defines exactly what he means by “perfect” in the context of animal generation. A 
                                                          
2 There is a detailed discussion of Pneuma etc by the translator, A.L Peck, in Appendix B of (4). 
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general reading of Generation of Animals (4) and History of Animals  (5,6) in both of which this 
word is used many times, however, reveals that Aristotle regards the perfect condition as that state of 
an animal which enables us to discern by its bodily form the species to which it belongs (i.e. to 
recognise it for what it is). Perfection is also an enabling condition, which allows the animal in 
question to generate another member of the same kind in the same perfect form: 
“Some animals bring their young to perfection and bring forth externally a creature similar to themselves…” [GA 
732a26-27]. 
 
A phrase that Aristotle uses often to explain this, is that perfect offspring have “the same name and 
nature” as their parents. Perfect also means “adult in form”. Interestingly, in the context of complete 
metamorphosis, entomologists sometimes still use the term “perfect” to mean “adult” (20).  
As noted above, the Greek word Teleos also means “complete”, in the sense of “finished”, and this 
means that an animal in this condition has no need to change in form or grow any further once it is 
“perfect”. Aristotle says: 
 “…some lay their eggs in a perfected state … eggs which once they are laid do not grow any more” [GA 732b1-6]. 
 
“Some creatures’ eggs are imperfect when laid … which become perfected i.e. grow, outside the creature which 
produces them.” [GA 718b6-8] 
 
This second idea of perfect and imperfect eggs corresponds well to the well-established modern 
contrast between the cleidoic (shelled) eggs of birds and reptiles, which do not grow, and the non-
cleidoic (shell-less) eggs of other vertebrates, which increase in size by taking up water (21). But the 
presence or absence of a size change is an unsatisfactory component of Aristotle’s thinking about the 
perfect state, because although the philosopher thinks that eggs that grow in size after being laid but 
before hatching must be lacking in perfection, he overlooks the criterion of growth when it comes to 
growth in size of the animal once it has hatched. Although Aristotle is aware that it would be very 
unusual indeed for an animal to be born or to hatch at its full adult size, he nevertheless considers the 
immature but adultiform animals that hatch from perfect eggs to be perfect themselves in form even 
if they are not yet “perfect in size”. He says: 
“No animal brings forth young that are perfect in size, because they all grow in size after they are produced.” [GA 
733b3-4]. 
 
Another aspect of Aristotle’s conception of the perfect condition, of which the significance has 
already been noted above, is that (quite incorrectly) Aristotle asserts that perfection is something to 
do with body temperature, as follows: 
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“The more perfect animals are those which are by their nature hotter” [GA 732b32-33].  
 
Another complication is that the philosopher also thinks that a hierarchy of perfection exists, in 
which the most perfect animals are at the top, with others below them according to their degrees of 
perfection. In allocating status in this hierarchy, Aristotle ranks animals into categories (I list them 
along with their modern names) as follows: (a) humans; (b) viviparous animals (e.g. mammals) that 
are not (he thinks) derived from eggs; (c) viviparous animals (e.g. some fish) that are derived from 
retained eggs; (d) oviparous animals (e.g. birds, reptiles, hemimetabolous insects ) that produce 
perfect eggs (i.e. they do not grow before hatching externally); (e) oviparous animals (e.g. teleost 
fishes, Crustacea, Cephalopoda), which copulate and thereby produce imperfect eggs that 
nevertheless “reach perfection outside the parent by means of growth”; (f) insects (he means here 
holometabolous insects) and other animals which generate larvae, either with or without the 
production of eggs, by means that he believes do not involve copulation. (GA 733a34-733b17). 
Aristotle explains this hierarchy by appealing to the same causative factors that we have already seen 
to preside over the acquisition of the perfect state.  In particular he supposes that progress from the 
lowest form of vegetative existence to progressively higher levels of organisation and  behaviour is 
due to the possession of a hierarchical sequence of different parts or faculties of  something that he 
calls Psyche (Ψυχή) or “soul”, which (as used here) means the actual (i.e. realised) essence of the 
animal.  
It is this hierarchical way of thinking about insect life cycles in terms of “perfection” that leads 
Aristotle to the (to us) counterintuitive conclusion that because hemimetabolous insects are born 
perfect, whereas their holometabolous relatives are born imperfect and must therefore acquire their 
perfection in later life, the latter must be the basal (i.e. undifferentiated) form from which the former 
are derived. He says: 
“In a way, it looks as though practically all animals produce a larva to begin with, for the fetation in its most imperfect 
state is something of this sort; and in all the Vivipara and all the Ovipara that produce a perfect egg, the fetation in its 
earliest stage is still undifferentiated and is growing and is just the sort of thing that a larva is” [GA 758a33-37]. 
 
This idea, reminiscent of Haeckel’s Biogenetic Law of recapitulation (22), certainly does not reflect 
the true course of evolution, since it is now quite clear that the Endopteryogota are in fact derived 
from the basal exopterygote condition (23), thus the opposite of what Aristotle had thought. 
 
5. Aristotle: inheritance and metamorphosis 
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Aristotle’s account of embryonic development focuses our attention on the limited understanding of 
the inheritance of form and its relationship to the taxonomy of living things that was possible at that 
time. Aristotle developed his own theory of inheritance, in which the species of organism into which 
the embryo develops depends on the inheritance of its Eidos (Είδος) or form (i.e. its essential 
species-level characteristics) from the male parent. Eidos arises during development through the 
action on passive materials derived from the female parent of an organising active principle (Pneuma 
and all that it implies – see above) that is present in the seminal fluid. This sexually divergent aspect 
of Aristotle’s theory of inheritance is usually termed “Reproductive Hylomorphy” (24) 3. Aristotle 
says: 
“The male provides the “form” and “the principle of movement”, the female provides the body, in other words the 
material” [GA 729a9-12]. 
 
But what of those organisms that Aristotle believes to be derived from unfertilised eggs, and those 
organisms that he supposes are generated spontaneously from inanimate material? Clearly, because 
in each of these cases they would lack those aspects of form that are supposed to be determined by a 
male parent, Aristotle’s principle of reproductive hylomorphy dictates that such offspring cannot 
belong to the same kind as either their male or their female parent. The philosopher duly decides that 
those kinds of organisms that are generated “without copulation” (i.e. by what he believes to be an 
asexual process of generation) must therefore at least initially have a different form or essence to the 
parents. They must instead, says Aristotle, undergo a process of metamorphosis that allows them to 
transform from the incomplete (imperfect) form of the larva to the complete (perfect) from of the 
adult. During the process, essential form (conferred by Pneuma) that was previously absent is 
acquired by the metamorphosing animal in some way that is different from fertilisation. He says: 
“Further, some animals are formed neither from creatures of the same kind as themselves nor from creatures of a 
different kind, examples are flies and the various kinds of fleas as they are called. Animals are formed from these it is 
true, but in these cases, they are not similar in character to their parents; instead we get a class of larvae” [GA 723b3-
7]. 
 
The importance of this difference in view of the plasticity of an organism’s essential nature can 
hardly be exaggerated. It is a fundamental cause of the divide between Aristotle’s biology and our 
own. The morphological species concept that has been current in biological science from the time of 
Linnaeus onward completely depends upon the idea that every living organism is a member of only 
one species and is generated only from the same species of organism (25). It is controversial whether 
                                                          
3 This way of looking at the morphogenesis of offspring arises from Aristotle’s general theory of causation; there is a good discussion 
of this in Peck’s Appendix B in his translation of Generation of Animals (4). In these terms, the organizing principle supplied by the 
male parent is an efficient cause; the material that is organized, which is supplied by the female parent, is the material cause; and 
the essential characteristics, or Perfect form of the developing animal is the formal cause.  
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or not the species concepts of Aristotle and Linnaeus, and also of modern biology, are 
philosophically essentialist ideas (26-31), but it is incontrovertible that the Linnean species is 
dependent on like breeding like. We now take it for granted that the nature of an animal is defined by 
its parentage. But for Aristotle, it is evident in the context of complete metamorphosis that the Eidos 
of an animal is not necessarily defined by a single essence at all, and that in metamorphosing 
animals, the need to metamorphose is due to the failure of the parent to transmit the essential nature 
that defines the adult form. Some organisms, he says, notably insects that undergo complete 
metamorphosis, adopt more than one form during their lives, and therefore must possess more than 
one type of Eidos. Moreover, says Aristotle, such animals obviously do not breed true, because the 
larval forms generated by such insects are quite unlike their parents. And before these larvae can 
become like their parents, they must transform into a different form of animal, only then acquiring 
the competence to generate further offspring (see Fig. 1a). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 near here 
 
6. Aristotle: insects that produce perfect offspring 
 
By contrast with holometabolous insects, the progeny of hemimetabolous insects, like those of the 
sanguineous or “blooded” animals (in Aristotle’s scheme, those that have red blood, such as both 
mammals and birds) are already “perfect” in that they are either born or hatch to produce an 
immature animal that can grow into an adult without further major morphological transformation, 
except growth in size. To be more accurate, in the case of the Hemimetabola this means “almost 
without”, since the immature insect’s wings and reproductive organs differ significantly in shape and 
size from the those of the adult. Aristotle says: 
“As regards insects, some of them copulate, and in those cases the young are generated from animals which are the 
same name and nature as themselves, just as happens in the blooded creatures; instances of this are locusts, cicadas, 
spiders, wasps, ants.” [GA 721a3-5].  
 
Aristotle refers here to members of orders that we would today class as hemimetabolous insects 
(namely locusts and cicadas) as well as other invertebrates (spiders). Never mind that he is wrong in 
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considering wasps and ants to be of this kind; we can see what he is driving at; the immature forms 
of locusts, cicadas, and spiders are indeed of the same kind as the adult forms 4.  
Notice that Aristotle links his statement that insects of this kind produce offspring with “the same 
nature and name as themselves” (i.e. that the immature insects are already perfect) with the assertion 
that they “copulate” (it is implied that other kinds of insects do not). The significance of the last 
point will become clear below. Perhaps confusingly, the metamorphosis of hemimetabolous insects 
like these is nowadays often designated as “incomplete”, but to Aristotle it was no metamorphosis at 
all because the nymph has the “same nature and name” as the adult, in other words they are already 
“complete”.   
Aristotle is not always very clear on whether he thinks that this kind of insect is generated as a 
perfect offspring by means of an egg. He clearly says that grasshoppers do copulate and lay eggs 
[HA 555b18-19]. But he then mistakes what is in fact the developing egg of a locust for a worm-like 
larva (this is surprising because if what he says were true it would mean that he would have to 
classify a locust as belonging to the class of insects that he says are generated spontaneously). He 
says: 
“[Locusts] deposit their ova in one spot, so as to make it appear like a honeycomb. As soon as they have deposited 
their ova, egg-like maggots are formed, which are covered with a thin coating of earth like a membrane, and in this 
they are matured. The young are so soft as to collapse if they are only touched. They are not produced on the 
surface, but a little below the surface of the soil; and as soon as they are matured, they escape from the coat of soil in 
which they are enclosed as small black locusts. Their skin is subsequently ruptured, and they then attain their full 
size." [HA 555b22-30]. 
 
This description is startlingly accurate, giving the strong impression that the philosopher has 
observed it at first hand.  Locusts do indeed lay their eggs underground within a foamy proteinaceous 
capsule. The “egg-like maggots” described by Aristotle are actually pharate first instar larvae, 
developing within an embryonic cuticle inside the egg. They subsequently migrate to the surface and 
undertake their first free-living ecdysis to hatch as first instar larvae that look like little locusts (32). 
 
7. Aristotle: insects that produce Imperfect offspring 
In considering other insects (they are the majority) that do not conform to the above pattern, Aristotle 
again appeals to the idea of a hierarchy of perfection, asserting that: 
                                                          
4 Aristotle’s error in the case of wasps and ants is curious, since he specifically refers to the generation of wasp larvae in HA 628a16-
22.  The error may arise from the fact that both these insects emerge from oviform pupae, which he may ether have mistaken for 
actual eggs, or have considered to be equivalent to eggs, despite the fact that they arise from a previous larval stage. 
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“since an actual animal is something perfect whereas larvae and eggs are something imperfect, Nature’s rule is that 
the perfect offspring shall be produced by the more perfect sort of parent” [GA 733a3-6]. 
 
He applies this idea to the larvae of holometabolous insects, which in his view are not “perfect” or 
“complete” because they don’t look like adults. Whether or not these creatures are produced from an 
egg (more on this below) their free-living immature form is that of a “worm” or larva [Scolex 
(Σκολήξ)] that has a completely different appearance from the adult. Instead, these imperfect larval 
insects, being of a different kind to the adult, feed and grow and eventually undergo a metamorphosis 
in order to become a pupa (a stage that is perfect, because it can give rise to an adult without further 
transformation). On multiple occasions the philosopher directly compares larvae and pupae to eggs, 
stating that these eggs initially lack perfection but acquire it as they feed and grow: 
“The larva, while it is yet in growth, is a soft egg” [GA 758b21-22] 
“All these larva-like objects, when they have advanced and reached their full size, become as it were an egg: the shell 
around them gets hard, and they remain motionless during this period. This is clearly to be seen with the larvae of 
bees, wasps and caterpillars.” [GA 758b15-19] 
 
“All of these [he is referring to apparently spontaneously generated insects such as clothes moths] first have the 
nature of a larva, then they remain motionless once the covering has solidified around them; after that the covering 
bursts and there emerges, as from an egg, an animal which, at this its third genesis, is at last perfected”[GA 758b24-
27]. 
 
 
8. Aristotle: animal generation with and without eggs 
It was noted above that Aristotle is careful to note that some animals copulate, while some do not. 
The reason for his interest in this issue concerns the question of whether all animals hatch from an 
egg. Some 2000 years later William Harvey asserted that generation does indeed always proceed 
from an egg (see below), but Aristotle came to a very different conclusion. 
In the case of “animals that copulate” Aristotle recognises that some sanguineous animals (notably 
all mammals, but also some cartilaginous fish) are viviparous, and because he cannot see that eggs 
are involved in the process, he erroneously concludes that these animals must be generated entirely 
without the involvement of eggs. Even when he dissects the body of a pregnant mammal or dogfish, 
he cannot find an egg because it is too small to be seen without magnification. He contrasts this 
situation with that of “lower” blooded animals (birds and reptiles) which produce large easily visible 
shelled eggs. He calls such eggs perfect because they do not increase in size before hatching. 
Additionally, Aristotle knows that there are other vertebrates (i.e. Amphibia and most fish) that lay 
eggs which clearly develop and grow in size before hatching; these eggs are therefore not perfect 
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offspring. It is significant in the philosopher’s view that such animals do not fertilise their eggs 
internally, but externally. He explains the adaptive value of this state of imperfection by pointing out 
that for ecological reasons (the high rate of mortality due to predation) these creatures need to 
produce very large numbers of eggs that cannot easily be accommodated within the female’s body, 
and so they are expelled at an early stage of their formation. However, the fact that they are 
subsequently fertilised allows them to become perfect as a consequence and to generate offspring 
that look like the parents. It seems to me very likely that it was this line of thought that led to 
Aristotle’s idea that fertilisation is necessary to the acquisition of the perfect state. 
But Aristotle also knows that some invertebrates (e.g. hemimetabolous insects) lay eggs that do not 
grow in size before hatching. Since all these animals enter free-living life looking like miniature 
adults, he considers their eggs to be perfect, like those of birds and reptiles. Aristotle’s language on 
this point is sometimes less than helpful, because in classifying the various generative methods he 
does not always distinguish between an imperfect egg and a larva (in his view they are really the 
same thing). But in the following passage, he makes the difference clear; it is based on whether the 
offspring is supplied with nourishment internally (this is an egg) or externally (not an egg).: 
“Some animals bring their young to perfection and bring forth externally a creature similar to themselves – e.g. those 
which are externally viviparous; others produce externally something which is unarticulated and has not yet assumed 
its proper shape. In the latter class those which are blooded lay eggs, those which are bloodless produce either eggs 
or larvae. The difference between an egg or a larva is this: an egg is something from part of which the new creature is 
formed, while the remainder is nourishment for it; whereas in the case of the larva, the whole of it is used to form the 
whole of the offspring” [GA 732a26-33]. 
 
Thus insects (otherwise considered by Aristotle to be a single kind of animal) pose the philosopher 
with a problem, because although some insects produce objects that look like eggs and satisfy his 
criterion of internal nourishment, and must be perfect because they hatch as perfect offspring, other 
insects generate only imperfect eggs or even (where the philosopher has no evidence of eggs at all) 
larvae that are apparently directly generated with no intermediate egg stage.  
What differentiates these two subclasses of insects? Aristotle solves the difficulty by supposing that 
the apparently perfect eggs of some insects are not really “eggs” at all (they are larvae or “fetations” 
that metamorphose directly into perfect miniature adults).  He says: 
“Of bloodless animals, insects produce a larva; this holds good both for those which are formed as a result of 
copulation and those which themselves copulate” [GA 732b10-12]. 
 
“Insects all produce larvae. Now all insects are bloodless, and that actually is why they are externally larva-producing” 
[GA 733a25-27]. 
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“The fifth class of creatures, which are the coldest of all, do not even lay an egg directly themselves, but the 
formation of their egg takes place outside the parent” [GA 733b11-13]. 
 
All this is crucially tied up with Aristotle’s idea of a hierarchy of perfection. Members of the class of 
animals that lay eggs (whether they are insects or not) are not so imperfect as those (such as insects) 
that produce worm-like progeny, which occupy the lowest position in the hierarchy of perfection, 
lower even than the eggs of those creatures “that copulate”. Even if the progeny of non-copulating 
insects and similar animals appear to emerge from structures that look like eggs, Aristotle says that 
they are not really eggs.  
Because of his ideas about how perfection is conferred (i.e. as the result of fertilization), Aristotle 
concludes that animals like this (i.e. holometabolous insects), which do not generate perfect 
offspring, must be generated spontaneously, i.e. without copulation. The philosopher does not 
consider the criterion for inclusion in this class to be absence of evidence for copulation of the 
parents or even of the presence of eggs; as we will see below, he dismisses such evidence as 
inadmissible even when he sees it with his own eyes. Instead, he simply asserts that generation must 
be spontaneous whenever the end of larval life is succeeded by metamorphosis, which is the process 
that allows an incomplete or Imperfect animal to achieve the perfect or complete form. This is the 
logic that explains why we still designate this type of transformation as “complete metamorphosis”. 
Aristotle now goes even further; he states that because it is the equivalent of the egg stage from 
which a perfect animal hatches, the pupal stage of a metamorphosing insect is in fact the functional 
equivalent to an egg. He says of insects of this kind:  
“…we are bound to reckon caterpillars … as a form of larva. True, some of these, and many belonging to other insects, 
would appear to resemble eggs on account of their circular shape; but our decision must not be determined by their 
shape nor yet their softness or hardness… but by the fact that the whole of the object undergoes change – the animal 
is formed out of the whole of it and not some part of it.” [GA 758b9-15]. 
 
“What happens is that Insects first produce a larva, then the larva develops till it becomes egg-like (what is called the 
chrysalis is really equivalent to an egg5); then out of this an animal is formed, and it is not until this third stage in its 
series of changes that it reaches the end and perfection of its generation.” [GA 733b11-17] 
 
9. Aristotle: spontaneous generation and metamorphosis 
As we have seen from the above, Aristotle thus not merely fails to dismiss the idea of spontaneous 
generation of living from non-living matter, specifically commenting without any apparent 
reservation that flies are generated de novo from the carcasses of dead animals, but he actually 
                                                          
5 The translator (Peck) comments that what Aristotle literally says is “has the dynamis of an egg” [4].  
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incorporates the idea of spontaneous generation into his scheme for the reproduction of the single 
most numerous and diverse category of animals. 
 Did Aristotle really believe in spontaneous generation? Most Aristotelian scholars have concluded 
that this was in fact the case, usually excusing the philosopher’s apparent credulity on the grounds 
that this was an understandable error given the almost universal belief in the spontaneous formation 
of some forms of life in ancient times (33).  If this is all that is behind it, however, then it is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that the philosopher was culpable in failing to test the idea of spontaneous 
generation experimentally; it would have been easy, even without sophisticated apparatus, for 
Aristotle to interrogate his hypothesis simply by protecting a putrefying animal carcass from 
ovipositing flies with a covering cloth, just as Francesco Redi was to do almost 2000 years later (34) 
[the story of Redi’s experiments is nicely told by Cobb (8)]. An objection to such a conclusion is of 
course that we cannot retrospectively expect Aristotle to do experiments, because the experimental 
approach to investigation had not then been invented. Leroi (2, pp 362-363 and notes thereon) is 
convincingly sceptical about the extent to which Aristotle employed or even understood the idea of 
an experiment. 
A notably different view, however, is that of Zwier (35), who sets out to construct what she calls a 
“more charitable view” of Aristotle’s erroneous views about spontaneous generation.  She points out 
that the philosopher goes to considerable lengths [GA 762a37-763a25] to interrogate critically the 
idea of spontaneous generation, using the same methods of questioning and logic that he employed in 
considering other problematic issues. It appears that despite his best efforts, the philosopher simply 
came to an answer that we now know to be wrong.  
Let us also be charitable. The ancient Greek philosopher’s text is not always clear, and he may 
simply have been saying that fertilisation is not always a prerequisite for the generation of a new 
animal. This is indeed absolutely true, and parthenogenesis is now known to occur widely in the 
Animal Kingdom [36], including in many insect species from most orders (37,38), although we have 
to note that Aristotle is highly unlikely to have encountered any example and known it for what it 
was. Even in the case of honeybees, on which he writes at length (see below), Aristotle fails to 
distinguish the sexual generation of workers from the parthenogenetic production of drones [GA 
759a8-761a37].  
But even if Aristotle is not really convinced by the idea of spontaneous generation from material that 
did not originate in flies, and he is indeed saying that flies arise from eggs derived from female flies 
but without fertilisation, then we have to ask where do those eggs come from?  
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10. Aristotle: fertilisation and metamorphosis 
The above discussion is relevant to Aristotle’s treatment of insect metamorphosis, because of the 
philosopher’s erroneous assertion that the eggs of holometabolous insects remain unfertilised; in this 
view, it is lack of Pneuma that leaves the eggs of holometabolous insects “imperfect” (i.e. lacking the 
capacity to go on to form the “perfect” or “complete” animal). This supposedly imperfect condition, 
he argues, requires them to undertake a life history that involves a period of growth and resource 
acquisition that only later enables them to transform autonomously into a perfect or complete pupa 
and then into an adult. For Aristotle, the generation of insect larvae is the same thing as spontaneous 
generation. 
The question of spontaneous generation is central to the theme of this paper because Aristotle now 
goes on, as a direct result of his belief that many insects are generated spontaneously, explicitly to 
hypothesize a general connection between complete metamorphosis and the presumed absence of 
previous fertilisation at the onset of life. The philosopher’s logical scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1b. 
This postulated connection is unfortunate because we can now see that the philosopher neither had 
sufficient evidence to confirm the absence of fertilisation in the case of flies, nor to generalise this 
absence to other holometabolous insects.  
Why did Aristotle erroneously believe that fertilization did not occur in those insects that undergo 
complete metamorphosis? I suggest that it was because he wished to extend the scope of another of 
his ideas about development, that sexual generation involves the transfer of an organising principle 
that determines the perfect or complete form of the animal in question. It was only by asserting the 
absence of sexual fertilisation in flies and other supposedly spontaneously-generated creatures that 
he was able to incorporate this idea into his general scheme of generation.  
Aristotle considers the event that we call “fertilisation” quite straightforwardly (he simply equates it 
with mating) and we need not worry that he might have meant something else by it. He is quite clear 
that the function of fertilisation is to confer perfection, or at least the capacity to acquire this 
condition, on the offspring. Aristotle envisages Pneuma as being present in the semen. Although 
semen is material in nature, the philosopher considers the Pneuma it contains to be an immaterial 
substance, in some ways similar to what we would now call a “vital principle” [but see note 37 in 
Peck’s Introduction to his translation of Generation of Animals]; Aristotle, however, appears to use 
the term in a more restricted, specifically developmental way, implying not that Pneuma confers the 
property of life itself, but that it is something that enables development to proceed towards perfection 
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by supplying a template that determines the general form of the resulting animal, thus allowing it to 
be recognised as belonging to its own species. Leroi (2, p90) has commented that it is interesting to 
say the least that Pneuma’s role in specifying the form of the embryo could be regarded as supplying 
the information necessary for embryogenesis, in exactly the same way that paternal and maternal 
DNA together specify the offspring’s phenotype. While we need to beware of anachronism (although 
Aristotle was interested in human genetics, his understanding of inheritance was at that time 
necessarily very limited) this is a timely reminder that teleology (in the sense of the specification of a 
developmental outcome before it has begun) has not completely disappeared from our current set of 
ideas about developmental biology. 
Unfortunately for Aristotle’s theory, there is in fact no connection at all between fertilisation and the 
incidence of complete metamorphosis. It is indeed true that some insect eggs are able to develop 
without fertilisation (see above), but Aristotle is unlikely to have encountered this. Given that he 
equated fertilisation with mating, Aristotle’s error is surprising. In Generation of Animals the 
philosopher states clearly that although he has observed insects mating, he does not believe that this 
activity is what it appears to be, because he does not believe that this act results in fertilisation. As a 
result, in some cases he simply denies that mating takes place at all, even though he says elsewhere 
that he has seen it to occur. For example, he says: 
“Other [insects] although they copulate and generate, generate not creatures of the same kind as themselves but 
only larvae, and these insects moreover are not produced out of animals nor do they copulate; such are gnats, 
mosquitoes, and many similar kinds of insects.” (GA 721a7-13). 
 
Alternatively, he explains the problem away by asserting that although in other cases copulation does 
indeed take place, no semen is transferred during the mating (even though he could not have known 
whether this was true). For example, he says: 
“The natural practice of those animals that emit no semen is to remain united for a long time, until [the male] has 
“set” the fetation: those insects which copulate are an example of this”. [GA 731a 15-18]. 
 
Aristotle is obliged to take this position simply because of his belief that the purpose of fertilisation 
is to confer Pneuma on the offspring of the union, and he has already decided that in these animals, 
their later metamorphosis is evidence of their lack of Pneuma. But the problem now arises that there 
has to be a cause (above all, Aristotle believes in causes) for the initiation of development in these 
supposedly unfertilised eggs.  Referring to those insects that mate, but which he believes transfer no 
semen, the philosopher now asserts that Pneuma acts at a distance, Nature itself intervening to 
initiate (spontaneous) generation: 
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“in the case of these insects [i.e. those that transfer no semen], the same effect [as is caused by semen] is produced 
by the heat and dynamis inside the [male] animal itself” [GA 729b29-31]. 
 
“males of this sort are so weak that Nature is unable to accomplish anything at all through intermediaries... their 
movements are only just strong enough when Nature herself sits watching over the business; the result is that here 
Nature resembles a modeller in clay rather than a carpenter; she does not rely upon contact exerted at second hand 
when fashioning the object which is being given shape, but uses the parts of her very own self to handle it”. [GA 
730b28-32]. 
 
 
11. Aristotle: metamorphosis and the resources available in the egg and larva 
Aristotle’s error concerning fertilisation is important, because it leads him to suggest that a 
holometabolous larva is unable to develop directly to adult form because the insect 
 “deposits the eggs as it were before their time, which suggests that the larva, while it is yet in growth is a soft egg” (GA 
758b19-22).  
 
He supposes that because it lacks Pneuma, the egg and the embryo it contains are unable to develop 
to perfection (i.e. is unable to reach “the right time”). To correct this lack of Pneuma, the Imperfect 
offspring must first undergo two distinct stages of growth and development before it can attain the 
perfect, complete form of the pupa-egg, which is only then able to generate an adult individual. In 
other words, it is because of the lack of Pneuma that metamorphosis is necessary (Fig. 1a). 
It is at this point in his argument that the philosopher appears to confuse the material and 
information-containing qualities of the developing insect. He says that because it is unfertilised, a 
holometabolous insect egg lacks the necessary resources to attain perfection, which must instead be 
acquired from some other source than the male parent. To do this, the egg hatches to an imperfect 
larval form, which: 
“does grow and takes nourishment, until its differentiation is effected and it has become a perfect egg” (GA 758b34-
36) 
 
The “perfect egg” that Aristotle is referring to here is the pupa. But from whence is the necessary 
Pneuma acquired? Here is yet another link between Aristotle’s ideas about spontaneous generation 
and metamorphosis. Effectively the philosopher is saying that spontaneous generation is merely the 
acquisition by an animal of the capacity to proceed in development. The result will be the same 
whether this capacity is acquired through fertilisation prior to the first (embryonic) metamorphosis, 
as in hemimetabolous insects, or from some unknown internal or environmental source prior to the 
second (pupal) metamorphosis, as in holometabolous insects. 
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But this causes yet another problem. Aristotle is now apparently supposing that the missing Pneuma 
is a material resource of some sort, for which some other substance present in the larva’s food (or at 
least manufactured from it) can be substituted. This supposition doesn’t fit with the idea presented 
elsewhere in Generation of Animals that Pneuma is not a material resource; moreover, since in this 
case Pneuma can evidently be acquired by both male and female larvae, it also doesn’t explain why 
in hemimetabolous insects (just as is the case in sanguineous animals), Pneuma can be supplied only 
by the father. The philosopher doesn’t seem to notice that he has previously asserted that it is only 
the female that contributes material to the egg, and that the male’s contribution to generation is 
limited to that of specifying form. (This is, of course, a quibble: today we see no problem in allowing 
that the informational content of the male’s contribution to the offspring is in fact embodied in the 
material substance DNA).  
 
12. Aristotle: the problem of honeybees 
Aristotle comes up against a particularly puzzling problem with honeybees, insects that he evidently 
studied in considerable detail himself as well as consulting professional beekeepers. He says “The 
generation of bees is a great puzzle” [GA 759a8]. The problem is as follows. He recognises that bees 
have three separate castes (he does not correctly interpret the reproductive roles of these castes, 
thinking that queens are actually “leaders” or “kings”, and he is also uncertain as to the sex of 
drones; but this is not the problem addressed here). First, Aristotle addresses the issue of whether 
bees are the result of spontaneous generation. To be consistent, this should be his conclusion, since 
bees are clearly members of the Holometabola. The philosopher considers among some other 
fantastic possibilities, that bees might actually “fetch their offspring from elsewhere…” these having 
“sprung into being spontaneously or [having] been produced by some other animal” [GA 759a10-14]. He 
rejects these possibilities and says that bees must copulate (even though he says that “none of them 
has ever been seen in the act of copulation” [GA 759a20-25); he concludes that they must mate to 
produce their own offspring, but then recognises that this causes its own problem, which is that one 
of the following three options must be true: 
“(i) each kind generates its own kind, or (ii) one of the three kinds generates the others, or (iii) one kind unites with 
another kind” [GA 759a16-18]. 
 
Aristotle now seems to despair, concluding that “all of these theories are impossible” [GA 759a25]. The 
first option is ruled out by the fact that each caste is clearly a single sex. Among the arguments 
advanced to show that the other two theories are unreasonable, he points out that if bees are not 
22 
 
generated by their own kind, then surely there would be no reason for bees altruistically to nurture 
offspring that are not their own: 
“All creatures which concern themselves about young ones take that trouble over what appears to them to be their 
own proper offspring” [GA 759a36-759b2]. 
 
It is evident that neither Aristotle nor his beekeeper informants know the answer to the question of 
how bee social life and sexual reproduction are organised (this is not surprising since (a) queen bees 
copulate on the wing to acquire semen, and (b) in any case produce the worker caste by means of 
parthenogenesis and reproduce sexually using internally stored sperm). In the end the philosopher 
decides that copulation probably does occur in bees (the reason for this decision is not properly 
explained, but it is pertinent that Aristotle notes that copulation can readily be observed in vespid 
wasps and hornets, and these are similar kinds of insects to bees).  
The philosopher now has a problem. Surely if bees do copulate then they should belong to that 
category of insects which he has elsewhere asserted produce perfect offspring? But Aristotle 
correctly notes that although bees (and other social hymenopterans) copulate, they nonetheless 
produce obviously imperfect offspring in the form of larvae, which follow a typical holometabolan 
life history: 
“The same sequence of development is followed by other insects which arise out of larvae, both those larvae which 
arise as the result of copulation of living animals and those which arise without copulation. Thus: the larvae of bees, 
anthrenas and wasps, while they are young take nourishment and are clearly seen to have excrement; but when they 
have passed from the larva stage to their clearly-defined stage – being then called pupae – they take no nourishment 
and have no excrement; they remain stationary, shut up inside, until their growth is complete, and then they break 
the covering with which the cell is sealed and make their way out” [HA 551a28-551b6]. 
 
He doesn’t address this problem except by asserting that some kinds of mating are not actually 
mating at all. Perhaps, not all of the offspring are generated in the same way? Aristotle correctly 
deduces that the “kings” or “leaders” (actually queens) generate both their own kind and also the 
ordinary “bees” (i.e. workers”), and even that drones are generated without copulation (although he 
incorrectly assumes that it is the workers that produce them). Having got so close to the right answer 
it seems disappointing that Aristotle fails to recognise that the drones are male and that it is they that 
mate with the female leader (queen). He concludes (wrongly) that the drones do not reproduce at all.  
He constructs a scheme that allows the leaders to generate their own kind by means of sex, and to 
produce other kinds of bees as offspring without mating but concedes that he has no evidence for 
this.  
“We see then that the manner in which bees are generated appears to be peculiar, in keeping with their 
extraordinary and peculiar character… The reason is that the “bees themselves” [workers] are not generated in the 
same way as flies and other such creatures, but from a kind which though different is akin to them – they are, of 
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course, generated from the “leaders.” [GA 760a5-13]. 
 
But then he is faced by yet another difficulty: if bees do generate offspring through copulation, then 
according to the philosopher’s own theory of generation, they should generate their own kind (i.e. 
caste); not a different kind of offspring. Here he is handicapped by failing to realise that the “leaders” 
are actually female queens. Since in Aristotle’s scheme of generation the form of the offspring is 
determined by male Pneuma, he could have argued that the form (caste) of the offspring produced 
either by mating with a male bee could have been determined according to whether the queen was 
mated or not.  
Eventually the philosopher gives up the effort to integrate the sexual life of bees with that of any 
other animal and concludes that they are in a class of their own. He says: 
“This then appears to be the state of affairs with regard to the generation of bees, so far as theory can take us, 
supplemented by what are thought to be the facts about their behaviour. But the facts have not been sufficiently 
ascertained, and if at any future time they are ascertained, then credence must be given to the direct evidence of the 
senses more than to theories” [GA 760b28-33]. 
 
13. Aristotle: both epigenesis and preformation 
As Devin Henry has pointed out (19), the autonomous development of a new animal from the 
material of an apparently formless egg can only be a source of wonder, whether considered from the 
point of view of an ancient Greek, a seventeenth century physician, or even a present-day citizen.   
Rejecting magic or miracles, two obvious explanations for such an astounding event are available; 
the first, essentially teleological idea of preformation is that the morphogenetic process requires a 
pre-existing template that imposes form on the materials of the developing embryo (i.e. 
morphogenesis is the result of preformation); the alternative, apparently mechanistic explanation of 
epigenesis is that morphogenesis is the result of untutored interactions between the materials of 
which the embryo is composed, (i.e. the formation of the offspring is due to spontaneous self-
assembly from its material parts). These two contrasting ideas about embryonic morphogenesis 
competed for scientific approval during much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (8).  
Aristotle is frequently represented as an early supporter of epigenesis (for example, Peck asserts in a 
footnote on p144 of Generation of Animals that “Aristotle was an epigeneticist”). Unfortunately, it is 
all too easy to attribute modern understanding to ancient authors, giving later meaning to their 
language that was not intended, nor even understood at the time; the meanings of the terms 
epigenesis and preformation have changed almost continuously ever since they were first used, and it 
is risky to recruit antique authors to modern arguments (39). And in fact, Aristotle’s position on the 
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question of epigenesis or preformation is never clearly stated (40). The philosopher is 
uncharacteristically modest in confessing his inability to explain what is going on, saying: 
“And on this subject we are confronted by no small puzzle” [GA 733b23-24]. 
 
However, we may glimpse Aristotle’s probable view in his long and detailed consideration of the 
possible mechanisms whereby embryogenesis might take place [GA 733b24-735a29]. The 
discussion is not of course conducted in the terms that are now familiar to biological scientists, of 
DNA, RNA and proteins; instead, the philosopher largely makes use of logic and analogy. Strongly 
implying that he has seen this for himself, he begins by correctly asserting that “our senses plainly 
tell us” [GA 734a22] that the structures of the embryo are not formed all at once but appear 
successively.  
Aristotle next considers the possibilities that these successive developmental events might all be 
initiated by a single initial causal factor but nevertheless appear sequentially, or that the various 
developmental events might each initiate the next (i.e. one thing leads to another). Aristotle’s 
discussion of the automaton analogy (see Section 2 above) makes it clear that he envisages both an 
original impetus (which we may interpret as a preformationist idea) and a subsequent self-organising 
process (epigenesis). He also follows this position when describing the events of development in a 
hen’s egg, in which (for example) embryonic anatomical structures appear serially in time and 
without apparent precedent within a formless matrix; in this he is clearly an epigeneticist; on the 
other hand, when considering the nature of the contribution made to the offspring by male 
fertilisation, he appears a preformationist, since the role of Pneuma is to supply a template that 
specifically confers certain attributes of the perfect (adult) creature. On the other hand, Aristotle also 
appears to reject preformationism, in the sense of transferring an actual preformed template from 
generation to generation. This template is not a permanent entity, he says, and until it is needed it 
exists only in potential form. He says: 
“It is clear by now that there is something which fashions the parts of the embryo, but that this agent is not by way of being a 
definite individual thing, nor is it present in the semen as something that is already perfected to begin with.” [GA 734b17-19]. 
 
“We have now determined in what sense fetations and semen have Soul and in what sense they have not. They have Soul 
potentially, but not in actuality” [GA 737a17-18]. 
 
Aristotle’s position is thus probably best represented by saying that morphogenesis takes place 
gradually through a process of internal change within the material of the egg or pupa, and that this 
developmental process is shaped by an externally supplied template newly formed in the embryo 
through the action of Pneuma. Despite the implication that the developmental process is at least 
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mechanically epigenetic, it can’t be denied that Aristotle does indeed envisage a supervisory 
teleological role for the template, once it has been formed.  
 
14. Aristotle reloaded: William Harvey 
Although the English court physician and anatomist William Harvey (1578-1657), famous as the 
discoverer through experiment of the circulation of the blood, claimed that his scientific knowledge 
came “not from positions of philosophers but from the fabric of nature”, he was also a keen student 
of Aristotle’s writings (41) and late in life (in 1651) he published a study of animal reproduction and 
development, Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium, that was heavily influenced by his classical 
Greek predecessor.  Harvey’s essential idea on morphogenesis was expressed in the motto “Ex ovo 
omnia” (from the egg, all) (9) 6. This work drew on Harvey’s experience as a medical practitioner as 
well as his dissections of developing hens’ eggs and pregnant deer from the King’s estates. But in it, 
Harvey also made a number of influential observations on the reproduction, development and 
metamorphosis of insects. Like Aristotle, Harvey was aware that it is much easier to study the 
process of morphogenesis in an insect pupa than in the eggs of birds or mammals.  
 
15. Harvey: perfect and imperfect eggs 
Harvey’s main ideas about spontaneous generation, fertilisation and metamorphosis (9) are in many 
ways very similar to those of Aristotle. The main difference between them is that Harvey insists that 
animals can only develop from eggs, and this must be true of insects too. This was in many ways an 
act of faith, since like Aristotle, Harvey could not actually see the eggs of mammals and other 
viviparous animals. As a consequence of this, Harvey’s definition of an egg is so plastic that it is 
hard to pin him down on just what he means by it. Basically, he says that an egg is some material 
substance which from an animal emerges. Thus, an egg may not look like an egg; an assertion of 
which he makes considerable use when considering insect complete metamorphosis. 
Importantly, however, one of Aristotle’s central notions about development retained unchanged by 
Harvey is the idea of the perfect state.  Thus, like Aristotle, Harvey asserts that the larva that hatches 
from the egg of a holometabolous insect is imperfect; it must feed and grow in order to attain 
perfection, and until it does so it is unable to generate another adult insect. He says: 
                                                          
6 These words appeared in the Frontispiece illustration to Harvey’s book, and it is uncertain whether he in fact wrote 
them himself, although they well summarise the content of the book. See the discussion in (42). 
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“Imperfect eggs we call those which are thrust out while they are immature and have not yet reached their full size 
but continue to grow outside the womb after they have been laid. …in this class also should be included the 
primordia of insects, which Aristotle calls worms, and of those creatures which arise spontaneously” (9, page 327). 
 
Harvey is explicit in saying (a) that the egg that generates an imperfect larva is not a proper egg, and 
as such should not be called an egg; (b) that perfection is only attained at the end of larval life, and 
that it is this that enables the metamorphosis of the larva to the “perfect egg” of the pupal state. This 
is what he says:  
 “So also among imperfect eggs, those are rightly so called from which a perfect animal is created, for example, the 
eggs of a fish, while others [i.e. eggs] from which an imperfect animal proceeds that is a worm or a caterpillar, are 
improperly so named. These are a kind of intermediary between a perfect and an imperfect egg, because in 
comparison with its own egg or primordium, it is an animal endowed with sense and motion that nourishes itself, but 
in comparison with the fly or butterfly whose primordium exists in it in potentia, it is to be accounted no more than a 
crawling egg, itself providing for its own growth. Such is a caterpillar which, having acquired its proper size, is 
changed into a chrysalis or a perfected egg, and ceasing to move is, like an egg, an animal in potentia” (9; page 327). 
 
Harvey follows Aristotle’s ideas on fertilisation and metamorphosis, being quite explicit in saying 
that the holometabolous insect egg is not originally fertilised by a male parent; moreover, since no 
subsequent fertilisation of either the larva or the pupa takes place, he concludes that fertilisation is 
unnecessary for the development of the perfect adult insect.  
Why did Harvey go to such trouble to deny the egg-nature of a holometabolous insect egg? I suggest 
that it can only be that it is because he could not exclude the possibility of spontaneous generation, 
which ever since Aristotle had been generally supposed to account for the generation of such insects. 
 
16. Harvey: spontaneous generation 
Thus, Harvey is obliged by his own logic to suppose that holometabolous insects do not undertake 
sexual reproduction.  Just as was the case for Aristotle 2000 years previously, Harvey is forced to 
deny the reality of what he has himself seen by saying:  
“But some of these spontaneously developed creatures, although they copulate in appearance, either do not beget or 
else they beget only some other thing… just as out of some caterpillars are created butterflies” (43; p 179)  - this 
passage is quoted verbatim in section 5 of the Introduction to (9).  
 
Thus, because Harvey believes against the evidence of his own eyes that holometabolous insects do 
not reproduce sexually, he is like Aristotle driven to propose the existence of a spontaneously 
generated transforming principle.  
Exactly what Harvey meant by “spontaneous” in this context is unclear and has been the subject of 
debate ever since his book was published. It is evident that Harvey considers two different types of 
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spontaneity. The first is that which permits an imperfect egg “univocally” (a word used here by 
Harvey specifically to mean without change in form) to generate an imperfect larva; following 
Aristotle, Harvey assumes that this kind of generation is independent of fertilisation. Even if mating 
appears to take place, there is no reason to suppose that it leads to fertilisation.  
Harvey’s second type of spontaneity is the “equivocal” transformation of the pupa into an adult 
insect (“equivocal” is a term here used by Harvey to mean that it involves a change of bodily form). 
Since no post-embryonic mating occurs prior to adulthood, this transformative generation must again 
necessarily be “spontaneous”. Indeed, Harvey more than once characterises all insects as sponte 
nascentia (spontaneously generated), even though he must have recognised that many insects do not 
follow the complete metamorphosis life history pattern that he is talking about. In this, Harvey 
appears less of an entomologist than Aristotle.  
This question of whether Harvey believed in spontaneous generation from inanimate material as it is 
now generally understood has been carefully examined (44). Although today we may find Harvey’s 
remarks about spontaneous generation to be unduly cautious, possibly even actually supportive of its 
spontaneity (through his failure to deny it), Harvey’s own contemporaries may have found his 
lukewarm words on the subject to be just the opposite; the publication of de Generatione appears to 
have led to a rapid change in general opinion (belief in spontaneous generation having been 
essentially universal prior to Harvey) that quickly led other scientists to devise their own 
experimental tests of the question.  
Although the by now elderly Harvey (who had made his name as an experimental physiologist) 
himself conspicuously failed to do any experiments, less than 20 years later the younger Italian 
scientist Francesco Redi (1668) interrogated the idea of spontaneous generation with a practical test 
(34, 45). Only seventeen years after the publication of Harvey’s book, Redi found by covering a 
vessel with a cloth that fly larvae are not generated on putrefying matter unless adult flies are 
allowed access. Famously, this was among the first scientific experiments to include a proper 
control, in which the covering cloth was omitted from a similar carcass. When reporting his own 
results, of course, Redi was keen to draw attention to the fact that in De Generatione Harvey had 
been reluctant to state that spontaneous generation did not occur. Thus, he was able to represent his 
own paper as a refutation of Harveys position (8). Having said this, though, although Redi’s 
experiment conclusively showed that flies are not spontaneously generated within an animal carcass, 
it took more than another 100 years before a general disproof of spontaneous generation in other 
organisms was accomplished (8,34,45). 
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17. Harvey: epigenesis versus metamorphosis 
Harvey has frequently been credited with advancing beyond Aristotle in considering the question of 
whether morphogenesis, either in the egg or in the pupa is due to an epigenetic process. We have 
already seen that Aristotle himself did not think that it was possible to separate the mechanics of 
development from its teleological purpose. The matter is some interest because of the extended 
argument that subsequently took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries about preformation, 
a debate that also incorporated ideas about free will and predestination (46). Simply stated, 
“preformation” is the idea that the morphogenetic process requires some form of pre-existing 
template to impose form on the material undergoing development.  
The problem with preformationism is that in tracing back the source of this preformed template, it is 
difficult to know where to stop; is the template created anew in each generation (in which case the 
idea has little to recommend it over epigenesis)? Or has the template always existed, having been 
passed unchanged through successive generations ever since the Creation? Preformationism in the 
latter sense did not long survive the discovery of the laws of genetics and the development of 
evolutionary theory (8, 42). But even before that, the debate over preformation drew on observations 
of the complete metamorphosis of insects. 
Harvey does use the word epigenesis, and indeed he probably invented it. But his conception of the 
mechanism of epigenesis and its significance in generation was very different from that of many of 
those who followed him. Whereas today we might consider that to display epigenesis the 
development of the embryo (or pupa) should be a process that occurs through some kind of self-
organisation, specifically without the benefit of a previously supplied exogenous template (i.e. it is 
not due to preformation), Harvey simply asserted that development is epigenetic in nature if it 
involves gradual processes of growth and acquisition of nutrients derived from outside of the larva 
itself; it is these materials that are converted by the egg itself into material of perfect form, this 
perfection being acquired gradually rather than all at once. Concerning the development of a hen’s 
egg, Harvey says: 
“What Aristotle says of about the generation of a perfect animals is undoubtedly true and clearly to be seen in the 
egg, namely, that not all the parts are made simultaneously but one after the other in order, and that the first to exist 
is the genital particle by virtue of which all the remaining parts do later arise as from their first original… And because 
no part begets itself, but after it is begotten, increases itself, so that part must needs be made first which contains the 
principle of increase… At the same time that part divides up and forms all the other parts in their due order. 
Therefore, in that same first begotten particle there is present from the beginning the soul, the author and principle 
of sensation and movement and of the life of the whole.” (9, page 240). 
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Like Aristotle, Harvey likens the process by which perfection is acquired to cooking (both of them 
took for granted that a supply of energy was something to do with the morphogenetic process). But 
unlike Aristotle, Harvey asserted that the transformation of an insect pupa to an adult is not 
epigenetic, because it occurs all at once, and involves no growth in size.  
Interestingly, in the light of the subsequent 200 year-debate as to whether morphogenesis is due to 
epigenesis or preformation, Harvey does not in De Generatione use the term preformation at all. 
Instead, he simply opposes epigenesis to metamorphosis. It has been suggested (46) that for Harvey 
there is a difference between metamorphosis and preformation, in the sense that he meant the term 
metamorphosis to apply only to non-sanguineous animals (i.e. mostly insects). It seems to me, 
however, that Harvey must have been well aware that his use of the term metamorphosis would be 
useful beyond just insects.  It is worth setting out exactly what he says: 
“Some animals are formed out of material that is already concocted and grown, and are transfigured, and all their 
separate parts arise at the same time by a metamorphosis, and a perfect animal is born. Some have their parts made 
one after another, and then, out of the same material they are at the same time nourished, increased and formed 
before the others which are formed later... Now the construction of these begins from some one part as from its 
original, and by its help the other members are produced, and these we say are made by epigenesis.” (9, page 202) 
 
It is in these terms that Harvey asserts that the first transformation undertaken by a holometabolous 
insect, in which the imperfect egg hatches to form an imperfect larva and subsequently increases 
greatly in size without significant change in morphology, is achieved through epigenesis, while he 
considers that the second transformation, in which the fully grown larva is transformed first into a 
pupa and then an adult, is achieved through what he calls metamorphosis. In other words, according 
to Harvey, epigenetic development is epigenetic simply because it is not metamorphic. 
But in my opinion Harvey goes further than this, adopting a position that may with justification be 
called preformationist, when he says of metamorphosis: 
“In generation by metamorphosis creatures are fashioned as it were by the imprint of a seal, or cast in a mould, that 
is the whole of the material being transformed. But an animal which is procreated by epigenesis draws in the material 
and at the same time prepares and concocts and uses it; at the same time that the material is formed, it grows…. 
From the homogeneous material it makes that which is heterogeneous, that is to say, out of the homogeneous 
material that is submitted to it, it makes organs that are heterogeneous.” (9, pp 203-204). 
 
We have previously noted that the position taken by Aristotle on epigenesis or preformation was 
equivocal. Harvey is here following the Greek philosopher in saying that the difference between an 
egg and a larva is that while an egg uses only a part of its resources to nourish the larva within it, the 
whole of the larva is consumed in the production of the pupa and then of the adult [GA 732a30-32]; 
the difference is that Harvey is using this fact to justify his statement that pupal-adult development is not 
epigenetic – Aristotle had said no such thing. Although the philosopher never used the term epigenesis or 
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anything like it, Arstotle (unlike Harvey) evidently did not consider epigenesis to be the opposite of 
metamorphosis. 
Why did Harvey differ from Aristotle on this point? Perhaps he had justifiable scientific concerns 
about whether it was possible to prove that epigenesis, in the sense of uninstructed autonomous self-
assembly, can occur at all. He did not discuss the point, but he may have been aware that to accept 
this kind of epigenesis as the sole explanation of animal (and implicitly human) development would 
require proof of the absence of a developmental template. To prove its absence would be difficult or 
even impossible unless he had certain knowledge of what such a template would look like, which of 
course he did not.  
Although it is not stated very clearly, it appears from De Generatione that like Aristotle, Harvey 
thought that the material content of the pupa is egglike and formless. He could only have thought this 
if he didn’t look very carefully at it. It would not have been necessary to use a microscope to 
discover that the pupal shell encloses what is obviously a developing adult insect right from the time 
at which it moulted from the final larval stage. The first person to say this in print (in 1669) was 
Marcello Malpighi (10) who stated that he had seen adultiform structures such as the wings and other 
appendages concealed under the cover of the late larval cuticle “even before the cocoon is spun”, and 
also in the pupa. Jan Swammerdam, who we now know had already seen the same thing (47), 
responded in the same year by publishing similar observations (11). We would now say that 
Malpighi and Swammerdam were looking not at the larva at all, but at the pharate pupa, a stage in 
between larval-pupal apolysis and pupal ecdysis, which pupa is still enclosed by the old larval cuticle 
(48). Although Swammerdam dedicated his book on silkworm anatomy and development to Harvey, 
in the text he condemned Harvey strongly for failing to examine the inside of the pupa properly. 
Nevertheless, Harvey deserves great credit for stimulating renewed interest in complete 
metamorphosis (49). 
It is unfortunate that Harvey’s own extensive notes on insect reproduction and development were 
destroyed during the English civil war (1642-1651) so that the entomological content of De 
Generatione was in the end much less detailed than its author had intended (9, p354). We can’t rule 
out the possibility that Harvey did indeed examine the inside of an insect pupa, and that he was 
aware that the inside was not formless, but nothing in De Generatione suggests this.  
 
18. Aristotle’s legacy:  neoteny, recapitulation, transcription factors and evo-devo 
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Aristotle’s (and Harvey’s) way of thinking about reproduction and development (especially its 
vocabulary) does not always make comfortable reading for a twenty-first century biologist. In 
relation to metamorphosis, the philosopher’s ideas about spontaneous generation, and the supposed 
lack of fertilisation in holometabolous insects are just wrong. But Aristotle’s legacy nevertheless 
continues to influence current thinking about metamorphosis, even if we do not always recognise the 
footprints of the philosopher on our own ideas.  
We do not know how the morphology and life-history of the ancestral holometabolan differed from 
its hemimetabolous precursor, nor what selective forces acted to cause its divergence from that 
condition (50) . In this respect, Aristotle’s opinons are still interesting. In particular, the 
philosopher’s idea that the larvae of insects undergoing complete metamorphosis are, as he put it, 
“born too soon”, and that this accounts for their simpler body plan when compared to the nymphs of 
hemimetabolous insects, has endured for over 2000 years.  The idea that we can learn about 
phylogeny from studying embryos has had an up-and-down history from about 1800, with the 
introduction of the idea of developmental recapitulation, to Haeckel’s Biogenic Law of the mid 
nineteenth century, and eventually the grudging acceptance in 1922 by Garstang (51) of a modified 
principle of embryonic recapitulation. Today, the emphasis in considering how embryonic and larval 
development influence and are influenced by evolution, is on the modulation of developmental 
timing or heterochrony, as was first suggested in 1930 by de Beer (52). The history of these ideas is 
well told by Gould (22).  
Aristotle’s basic idea (adopted without change by Harvey) about the complete metamorphosis of 
insects was that in preparing to hatch from the egg, the embryo of such insects develops 
heterochronously; instead of developing to an adult-like form as hemimetabolous insects do, a 
holometabolous embryo fails to progress towards perfection and thus retains a neotenous embryo-
like form when it hatches. This is the larva, which has a typically “primitive” morphology, quite 
unlike the adult it is destined eventually to become. Many adaptive benefits can now be proposed to 
result from this developmental delay, which range from a faster rate of feeding and growth to 
enhanced defensive capacity (50). This is what Aristotle actually says: 
“The fifth class of creatures, which are the coldest of all, do not even lay an egg directly themselves, but the formation of their egg 
takes place outside the parent… What happens is that insects first produce a larva, then the larva develops till it becomes egg-
like…” [GA 733b13-15]. 
 
In proposing this idea, Aristotle thought that the reason for the prolongation of embryonic condition 
into larval life was the result of its being generated without parental fertilization, and in consequence 
suffering from a lack of Pneuma. In turn, absence of Pneuma meant that the developing insect was 
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imperfect or incomplete and was therefore unqualified to progress to a “higher” level of development 
(we have already discussed what “higher” means).  
In modern terms, the idea that complete metamorphosis is linked to the absence of fertilisation is just 
wrong. But Aristotle’s concept of a requirement for Pneuma to enable morphogenesis to progress is 
much closer to modern understanding. Although the philosopher conceived Pneuma to be an 
immaterial substance that enables development to continue towards the perfect state, Pneuma may 
nevertheless be regarded in modern terms as equivalent to an enabling signal within the embryo, 
which licenses an existing developmental programme to progress. Further discussion of the possible 
involvement of Pneuma-like factors in the evolution of complete metamorphosis would be unwise, 
partly because Aristotle’s ideas were formed in a completely different intellectual context, but also 
because present day molecular understanding of insect development remains incomplete and is 
limited to just a few species; moreover, after 350 MY the role of any such factor in present day 
insects is in any case unlikely to be the same as it was in the insect that underwent complete 
metamorphosis for the first time. 
Following Aristotle, but in general not acknowledging their debt to the ancient philosopher, several 
entomologists have proposed theories to  explain the evolutionary origin of the holometabolous 
larval stage that are based on heterochronic expression of developmental factors that regulate 
progression from the imperfect to the perfect condition; they include Lubbock (53), Berlese (54), 
Imms (55), Williams (56), and Truman and Riddiford (57-59). Like Aristotle and Harvey, all of these 
theories suppose that the larva is “born too soon” in a condition which is developmentally immature 
only in the sense that some developmental pathways that would normally be activated at an earlier 
stage have not yet been recruited. It is not necessary to suppose that the larva is literally a delayed 
embryo. Moreover, as pointed out by both Lubbock (53) and Williams (56), one would not expect 
that present-day insect larvae and pupae would have spent the 350 MY period since the origin of 
holometaboly uninfluenced in form by selective pressures.  
In this special issue, other papers by Bellés (60) and Ishimaru et al. (61) Jindra (62) and each discuss 
alternative theories for the origin of the pupa; these are derived from the idea of Hinton (63), which 
supposes that the pupal stage arose as a modified final larval stage. But even here, we can recognise 
the unacknowledged debt to Aristotle, because the basic idea is one of the modulation in time of the 
sequence of developmental change. Here, the characteristics of the pupal stage might be explained by 
supposing that some (but not all) aspects of adult form might be recruited heterochronously in the 
last preadult stage, resulting in the production of an external body shape that is intermediate between 
the ancestral adult and larval forms. This would explain why the pupa prematurely displays many 
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external (cuticular) features which are similar to but less well-developed than those of the adult (e.g. 
well-developed appendages), while the expression of other typically adult features (e.g. reproductive 
organs) is delayed until the true adult stage. Such a scheme isn’t enough to “explain” the pupa as we 
know it, since there are also other aspects of the pupal phenotype (cessation of feeding, extensive 
reorganisation of internal organs etc.), which are specific to the pupal stage, but this might be 
secondary to the original heterochrony.  
 
19. Conclusion 
Many (although admittedly not all) of Aristotle’s contributions to biology, developmental biology in 
particular, were astonishingly penetrating considering that they were made almost 2500 years ago (1-
3). I hope that in this paper I have managed to highlight the significant role that the philosopher’s 
examination of the complete metamorphosis of insects played in the development of his thought 
concerning morphogenesis. There is no doubt that his impact on our understanding of metamorphosis 
was great, not least because his ideas were the starting point for the much later work of Harvey, 
Malpighi and Swammerdam.  
Even when Aristotle’s influence has not been recognised by those in his debt, we continue to 
subscribe to his basic idea that most of animal development can be ascribed to a combination of a 
pre-programmed sequence of morphogenetic change that progresses stepwise towards a genetically 
defined (in Aristotle’s terms, “perfect”) endpoint, and a process of epigenetic development that 
realises the potential that is inherent in the material components of the egg.  
On the other hand, we no longer think, as Aristotle and Harvey did, that an insect pupa is similar to 
an egg. Moreover, our modern understanding that “spontaneous generation” does not occur in nature 
has freed us from the need of those early writers to explain complete metamorphosis as a 
consequence of such spontaneity. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
Figure 1.  
Aristotle’s concept of the perfect or complete state and its implications:  
a. the concept of the perfect state leads Aristotle to conclude that a holometabolous insect larva 
differs from the adult of the same species because it lacks Pneuma.  
b. Aristotle concludes that because holometabolous larvae lack Pneuma they must be generated 
spontaneously (i.e. without fertilisation). Even if these insects appear to mate, they do not really do 
so. 
c. Aristotle recognises that larval-pupal morphogenesis is a gradual process that involves feeding and 
growth, and in which perfect form develops as a result of the gradual accumulation by the larva of 
Pneuma from outside of itself. 
d. Aristotle considers that pupal-adult morphogenesis is an abrupt process that does not involve 
feeding and growth, and in which perfect form is generated from a template provided by Pneuma. 
Aristotle contrasts this with the gradual development of the prefect state in (c). Note, however, that 
although Harvey later regards non-gradual pupal-adult transformation as necessarily non-epigenetic, 
contrasting it with gradual larval-pupal development, Aristotle does not draw such a distinction. 
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